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Abstract We represent consensus formation processes based on iterated opinion pool-
ing (DeGroot in J Am Stat Assoc 69:118–121, 1974; Lehrer and Wagner in Rational
consensus in science and society: a philosophical and mathematical study. Springer,
Berlin, 1981) as a dynamic approach to common knowledge of posteriors (Aumann in
Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis in J Econ Theory
28:192–200, 1982). We thus provide a concrete and plausible Bayesian rationaliza-
tion of consensus through iterated pooling. The link clarifies the conditions under
which iterated pooling can be rationalized from a Bayesian perspective, and offers an
understanding of iterated pooling in terms of higher-order beliefs.
Keywords Iterated pooling · Dynamic agreement theorem · Social epistemology
1 Introduction
This paper is about two influential models of convergence of probabilistic opinions:
consensus through opinion pooling (DeGroot 1974; Lehrer and Wagner 1981), and
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In linear pooling, upon learning what others believe each agent forms her new belief
by taking a linear combination of the opinions of herself and of others, weighted by
how much she trusts or respects them. By iterating this process sufficiently often the
agents will converge to a fixed point in the space of opinions. In Bayesian models of
agreement, on the other hand, upon learning what the others believe, the agents update
their beliefs by Bayesian conditioning. Under the assumption of a common starting
point and under the further assumption that agents know the type of information, but
not the information content, that others have been given in the meantime, iteratively
announcing the posteriors will lead the agents to agree.
While it has been claimed that both models offer a method to achieve consensus
that is rational in its own right (Aumann 1976; Lehrer and Wagner 1981), doubts have
been cast on the conceptual compatibility of pooling and Bayesian updating—see in
particular the discussion in Bradley (2007) and Steele (2012). Moreover, Bayesian
updating is often taken as the “basic normative standard” for rational belief change
(cf. Bradley 2007, p. 12). This leads to the question whether iterated pooling can
be given a Bayesian rationalisation. Interestingly, this is what Aumann writes in his
seminal paper:
It seems to me that the Harsanyi doctrine is implicit in much of [the literature
on opinion pooling]…The result of this paper may be considered a theoretical
foundation for the reconciliation of subjective probabilities [i.e., by means of
pooling].
To the best of our knowledge, Aumann’s suggestion was never converted into a formal
result. Can we indeed reconstruct iterated pooling in Bayesian terms, in such a way that
the sequence of steps towards consensus taken by iterated pooling can be motivated
and accounted for?
Several results have already shown necessary and sufficient conditions for the
Bayesian representation of a single pooling operation (Genest and Schervish 1985;
Bonnay and Cozic 2015; omitted for blind review, 2015). So there is a Bayesian rep-
resentation of agents engaged in pooling, and hence there is, in a strict sense, a formal
account of iterated pooling as well. But what is lacking is an account of why these
iteration steps should be taken in the first place. What underpins the specific social
influence that is modeled by iterated pooling? The idea behind pooling is that the
agents trust or respect, to various degree, the opinion of the others. But there is no
such thing as trust, at least on the face of it, in the Bayesian redescription of pooling,
and the iterations of pooling lack proper motivation.
We provide a representation theorem that makes good on Aumann’s suggestion
and thereby answers the above questions: consensus via pooling can be represented
as an Aumann-style agreement through updating. Iterated pooling is thus rationalized
according to Bayesian standards, as a matter of higher-order reasoning. More precisely,
the repeated adjustments of pooling can be represented as steps in which the agents not
only rely on their own beliefs regarding the reliability of the others, but also on their
beliefs regarding the others’ beliefs in their reliability, and so on. The representation
offers a concrete interpretation of the epistemology of iterated pooling: pooling steps
constitute an exchange of information, and the trust that agents put in each other
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translates into beliefs regarding the reliability of others on different levels of the belief
hierarchy.
In what follows we assume familiarity with iterated pooling, and so only introduce
it briefly in Sect. 3. Agreement theorems and their dynamic versions, which underlie
our representation, are far less discussed in the social epistemology literature. So we
present them in some detail in Sect. 2. We prove the main theorem in Sect. 3. Section
4 discusses the interpretation of pooling that the representation gives, and considers
the Bayesian model as an expression of conditions of applicability.
2 Dynamic agreement result
We survey here the original agreement theorem of Aumann (1976), and the dynamic
formulation of the result by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982). We end with
a detailed analysis of the events on which agents update in their dynamic approach
to common knowledge. This is crucial for the proof of the main theorem in the next
section.
2.1 The agreement theorem
First we define the algebraic structure that will be used in what follows. Let WA and
WE be finite sets with elements wA and wE , respectively, and let W = WA × WE
be a finite set of possible worlds.1 We can partition W into sets of worlds [wA] =
{w : w = 〈wA, v〉 with v ∈ WE }, and similarly into sets of worlds [wE ] = {w :
w = 〈v,wE 〉 with v ∈ WA}. We denote the set of all such sets [wA] with [WA] and
similarly for [WE ]. Now we define A as the algebra generated by the set [WA], that is,
the algebra of factual propositions A = P(WA) × {WE }, and similarly we define the
algebra of epistemic propositions E = P(WE )×{WA}. Finally, we write U = P(W )
for the algebra of all propositions.
We now give more detail on the interpretation of these algebras. Consider two
agents, Raquel and Quassim. The elements A ∈ A represent material facts. Next to
this, we have epistemic facts, expressed as elements of E . These concern the opinions
of Raquel and Quassim about propositions A but also the opinions that the two agents
have about each others opinions, and so on. Every world w is characterized by a truth
valuation over all the material facts in A and over all the epistemic facts about the
agents in E .
The opinions of Raquel and Quassim are expressed by probability functions PR
and PQ , both of which are defined on the algebra U . Propositions about opinions
will be denoted by means of upper corners, ·. For example, the proposition that
Quassim has the opinion PQ(A) = q is written as PQ(A) = q. In what follows
we only consider opinions about A and, therefore, abbreviate this to q, and sim-
ilarly for Raquel, writing PR(A) = r as r. Raquel might assign a probability
to the proposition q, expressed in PR(q), and similarly Quassim may have an
1 As will be explained below, we restrict attention to a finite approximation of consensus by iterated pooling.
So it will be sufficient to work with finite algebras in the Bayesian models as well.
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opinion about the proposition that Raquel assigns some probability p to his opinion,
PQ(PR(q) = p).
Such propositions are included in the algebra E of epistemic facts about Raquel and
Quassim. Recall that the set of worlds W and the algebras defined on it are all finite. This
also holds for E . Hence, we do not consider all possible probability assignments for the
agents. We only consider the probability assignments and corresponding propositions
salient for present purposes, namely those that are needed for the representation of
iterated pooling. We will elaborate on these propositions below but first we introduce
further elements of the algebra E .
Quassim and Raquel may also have knowledge, rather than mere opinions, about
each others’ opinions.2 For instance, Raquel may know that PQ(A) = q, written
as K RPQ(A) = q. With such propositions on knowledge or information states of
Raquel and Quassim, we now associate the further algebras R and Q. These alge-
bras are based on specific partitions of W , the so-called information partitions. The
members of these partitions, R j and Qk , represent the maximally specific information
states in which Raquel and Quassim might find themselves, i.e., the maximally specific
propositions that they might know.
We can now specify the knowledge operators K R and K Q , and the notion of common
knowledge, in terms of these information partitions. We write RI (w) for the partition
cell R j that contains w, i.e., I (w) is a function that returns the value for j such that
w ∈ R j . The proposition that Raquel knows some proposition U , written K RU, is
the set of all worlds that are a member of a partition cell fully included in U :
K RU = {w : RI (w) ⊆ U }.
Accordingly, Quassim knows that Raquel knows U in all the worlds whose partition
cell QI (w) is fully included in K RU . Worlds included in a partition cell Qk that
overlaps with, but is not fully included in K RU do not qualify. Formally:
K QK RU = {w : QI (w) ⊆ K RU}.
The entire hierarchy of higher-order knowledge propositions can be built up in this
way. We define “everybody knows U up to level n” inductively as follows: E0U is
just U , and En+1U is K REnU∩K QEnU. Following the standard definition
(Aumann 1976), the proposition that U is common knowledge between Raquel and
Quassim, written CRQU , is obtained by taking the limit of EnU for increasing n:
CRQU = ∩n<EnU . To say that U is common knowledge for Raquel and Quassim
is to say that we cannot, by some series of mutually overlapping R j ’s and Qk’s, reach
a world outside of U : the set U is closed under the application of knowledge operators.
2 The proposition that Raquel knows Quassim’s opinion is logically stronger than the proposition
PR(PQ(A) = q) = 1. Judging some proposition to have unit probability is not enough for saying
that it will obtain. For example, if one samples individuals from an infinite population in which there is
only one individual satisfying some property, then one will assign the satisfaction of that property for the
next individual a unit probability even while, strictly speaking, one does not know that the next individual
will satisfy it.
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To express the agreement theorem, we must suppose that the opinions of Raquel
and Quassim PR and PQ have been obtained from updating a regular common prior
P , i.e., a prior that is shared by both agents and non-zero everywhere on U , on private
information, R0 and Q0, respectively:
PR(·) = P(·|R0), (1)
PQ(·) = P(·|Q0). (2)
Clearly, Raquel and Quassim do not know what private information the other has. The
information partitions, however, are common knowledge. Raquel and Quassim know
that the other agent receives information in the form of a proposition from Q and R,
respectively, and they know what these algebras look like.
Agreement Theorem (Aumann 1976)
Assume that Raquel and Quassim have a common prior and that in a world w their
posterior beliefs PR(A) = r and PQ(A) = q are common knowledge, viz. w ∈
CRQ(r ∩ q). Then, their posterior beliefs coincide in that world, r = q.
This result rests on the properties of the set of worlds CRQ(r ∩ q), i.e., worlds
in which common knowledge of the posteriors obtains. In particular, note that for any
element R j from Raquel’s information partition we must have P(A|R j ∩ CRQ(r ∩
q)) = r because if not, Raquel or Quassim would consider it possible that Raquel’s
opinion were unequal to r , thus violating common knowledge. By the law of total
probability, we therefore have P(A|CRQ(r ∩ q)) = r . The same will hold for
Quassim, i.e., P(A|Qk ∩CRQ(r∩q)) = q for any k and hence P(A|CRQ(r∩
q)) = q, and thus r = q.
2.2 Dynamic agreement
The original agreement theorem is static. It establishes the equality of the posteriors
under the assumption that common knowledge has obtained. Our Bayesian repre-
sentation of the pooling model of consensus rather rests on a dynamic version of the
agreement theorem due to Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982). They show iterated
exchange of opinions will lead to common knowledge among Raquel and Quassim and
hence, under common prior, to agreement. Importantly, there are only finitely many
propositions on opinions that are exchanged in the approach to common knowledge
detailed below, and this explains that the algebras R and Q are indeed finite.
For the dynamic approach to common knowledge, we again assume a common prior
P over U , so that Raquel and Quassim start with the same opinion, r0 = P(A) = q0,
with r0 = W = q0. Our agents acquire information privately, R0 and Q0, update
on this information and so arrive at the starting opinions of Eqs. (1) and (2). Raquel and
Quassim then disclose their opinions about A and, assuming common knowledge of
the information partitions, they each update on this information, revising their opinion
on A according to what the other person thinks, and according to what they now know
the other person knows about them. After this the cycle repeats. Importantly, they
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Fig. 1 The Aumann structure for Raquel and Quassim with common knowledge of posteriors showing as
the proposition in bold
update by conditioning so that their subsequent probability assignments can all be
traced back to a common prior P . Raquel and Quassim go through belief states that
are conditioned on ever more specific propositions.
Focusing first on Raquel’s epistemic development, at any stage she updates by con-
ditioning on the opinion that Quassim holds at that stage. For instance, when Raquel
learns Quassim’s initial opinion, PQ(A) = q1, she conditions her probability assign-
ment according to PR(A|q1) = r2. In particular, she will progressively eliminate
some set of elements Qk of Quassim’s information partition that cannot be squared
with Quassim’s current opinion. At every stage, her reasoning is: “If Quassim had
initially learnt the information Qk , he would not now have the opinion qi about A”. In
this manner, Raquel iteratively reconstructs the element Q0 that Quassim must have
learnt, up to equivalence in terms of Quassim’s posterior. The same holds for Quassim,
who eliminates elements from the information partition of Raquel up to equivalence
with R0, at which point Raquel’s opinion does not allow him to eliminate any further
elements. This is when common knowledge of posteriors is reached.
Figure 1 illustrates this iterative process for Raquel and Quassim. The cells are
sets of possible worlds. The thinly delineated rows and columns represent elements
R j and Qk , respectively. Raquel and Quassim learn that the actual world is in the
last row R0 and in the rightmost column Q0, respectively, both of which are coloured
grey. Accordingly, the actual world is in the bottom right grey corner. The coarse-
grained rows Ri represent sets of elements R j that Quassim eliminates at subsequent
update stages, after learning Raquel’s subsequent opinions ri , and vice versa for the
columns Qi , which consist of elements Qk . The common knowledge proposition
CRQ(r ∩ q) is delineated in bold.
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At each round, Quassim and Raquel do not only learn the opinion of the other,
though. They also learn that the other has learned their own previous opinion. The
exchange of opinion is completely transparant for both of them. So Quassim will
himself alter the set of worlds that he takes to be accessible for Raquel: he eliminates
all the worlds outside K Rq0 from Raquel’s domain, and similarly for Raquel, who
eliminates all worlds outside K Qr0.
It is important to observe that even though this exchange of opinion is completely
public between Raquel and Quassim, a single round of simultaneous updates on each
other’s opinions needs not to create common knowledge of their posteriors. It does
create common knowledge of what these posteriors were before the announcement.
But upon learning the opinion of the other about A, both Raquel and Quassim can
change their own opinion about A. When Quassim announces his current posterior to
Raquel, he of course knows that Raquel has learned his opinion. But he also realizes
that Raquel’s old opinion r1 may not be her new opinion anymore. She could have
changed her mind upon learning Quassim’s opinion, and he needs not to know exactly
how. The same goes for Raquel. So even though a simultaneous, fully public exchange
of posteriors between Raquel and Quassim creates common knowledge of what these
posterior where before the exchange, it needs not to create common knowledge of
what the posteriors are after. To reach that they need more steps.
Updates are repeated every time Quassim and Raquel disclose their new opinions,
creating two sequences of events, ri and qi. At each step, these sets cover fewer
elements of the information partitions R and Q, respectively. The sets ri and qi
hence form so-called filtrations, i.e., sets with index i +1 are nested in those with index
i . Referring back to the diagrammatic representation above, we partition W according
to these filtrations into:
Ri = ri−1 \ ri, (3)
Qi = qi−1 \ qi. (4)
So the sets Ri and Qi consist of those elements of the information partitions R j and
Qk that are ruled out in update stage i . As indicated, they are coarse-grainings of the
information partitions R and Q. Notably, they do not coincide with the sets of worlds
eliminated at every update stage because Raquel and Quassim have already learnt R0
and Q0. The agents eliminate elements of the information partition of each other only
insofar as these overlap with R0 and Q0, respectively, and they record the elimination
of elements of their own information partitions only to keep track of what the other is
thinking of them.
We are now ready to offer a recursive definition of the events ri and qi, and
hence of the sets Ri and Qi , in terms of specific probability assignments within these
events:
qi = {∪k Qk : P(A|Qk ∩ ri−1) = qi } ∩ qi−1,
ri = {∪ j R j : P(A|R j ∩ qi−1) = ri } ∩ ri−1.
Notice that the events qi and ri include all the Qk and R j that are consistent with
the information that Raquel and Quassim, respectively, have about the opinion states
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of the other. Equations (3) and (4) show how these events relate to the events that
Raquel and Quassim eliminate at every stage.
In the definition of the events ri and qi, we can see the interplay between
Raquel and Quassim at work. When Raquel wants to determine which elements Qk
are included in qi, she restricts attention to those Qk inside qi−1, which have
not been ruled out. But she then looks whether P(A|Qk ∩ ri−1) = qi , because
she wants to see if Quassim, who now has the opinion qi and who has updated on
her earlier opinion ri−1, could have learnt Qk . To do this, however, she needs to
know precisely what Quassim took away from her earlier opinion, ri−1, and for that
she needs the definitions of both ri−2 and qi−2, and so on, all the way down the
epistemic hierarchy.
With this in place, we can specify the two update series that govern the opinions of
Raquel and Quassim:
ri+1 = PR(A|qi) = P(A|R0 ∩ qi),
qi+1 = PQ(A|ri) = P(A|Q0 ∩ ri).
So these updates affect the probabilities that Raquel and Quassim have for A and lead
them from ri to ri+1, and from qi to qi+1, starting from r1 and q1, respectively. In
addition, they both update with the knowledge that the other agent learnt something.
However, this second update has no impact on their probability for A:
PR(A|qi) = PR(A|qi ∩ K Qri),
PQ(A|ri) = PQ(A|ri ∩ K Rqi).
The update is nevertheless important for our understanding of the approach to common
knowledge. After having updated on the other agent knowing their opinion, they do
not know anymore what the other thinks about A. So this update explains that Raquel
is ready to accommodate Quassim’s new opinion qi+1, and that Quassim is ready for
Raquel’s new opinion ri+1 too, after both have gone through update round i .
The exchange of opinions will continue until the opinions of Quassim and Raquel
concur at some stage, qn = rn say. To see how this obtains, recall that at stage n
Raquel only considers worlds within R0 ∩ qn−1 possible and, similarly, Quassim is
left only with worlds in Q0 ∩ rn−1. Moreover, Raquel and Quassim know of each
other that they only consider worlds within qn−1 ∩ rn−1 possible. But imagine
that for every Qk ∈ qn−1 we have that P(A|Qk ∩ rn−1) = qn , and that for every
Rk ∈ rn−1 we have that P(A|Rk ∩ qn−1) = rn . In that case, the only probability
for A that Raquel might have is rn , and similarly qn is the only probability left open
for Quassim. At any earlier stage, both will have had some variation in the probability
of A over the elements from their information partitions within qn−1 ∩ rn−1, but
at round n this probability is constant for both.
This is the point of the dynamic version of the agreement theorem due to Geanako-
plos and Polemarchakis (1982), i.e., the result that “we cannot disagree forever”. For
an informal grasp of their result, we observe that at round n the opinions of Raquel
and Quassim are indeed common knowledge: neither can conceive that the other will
have a different probability for A than what they have, and they also know this of
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each other, know that they know this, and so on. In terms of the characterisation of
common knowledge above: there is no series of mutually overlapping R j ’s and Qk’s
such that either agent can arrive at a world at which the probability assignment for A
differs from rn or qn , because these assignments are constant over all accessible rows
and columns. This fact, which establishes the common knowledge of the probability
assignments, namely that the probabilities are constant over all remaining sets within
both information partitions, is also responsible for the equality of these assignments.
We obtain full agreement about A, rn = qn , by the marginalization argument already
given in the context of Aumann’s static result.
2.3 Approach to common knowledge: example
It will be insightful to provide a brief example of the approach to common knowledge,
with which we can illustrate the diagrammatic representation given above. The exam-
ple is inspired by the one provided in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) but it
is constructed to match a simple pooling case, as presented in the next section.
Consider the set of worlds and the information partitions given in Fig. 2. The dots
represent equiprobable possible worlds. Solid dots are worlds in which A is true, open
dots represent worlds at which ¬A is true. At the outset Raquel learns R0 and so she
has a probability of r1 = P(A|R0) = 930 = 310 , while Quassim learns Q0 and so has
q1 = P(A|Q0) = 1830 = 35 .
Raquel and Quassim then tell each other their probability assignments. Upon hear-
ing q1, Raquel concludes that Quassim cannot have learnt Q1 because if he had, he
would have given A a probability of 110 instead. But he could still have learnt Q2
because P(A|Q2) = 1220 = 35 as well. Hence, Raquel takes q1 = Q0 ∪ Q2 and
eliminates Q1. Her new probability for A becomes r2 = P(A|R0 ∩q1) = 720 . Upon
Fig. 2 Example of an Aumann
structure for Raquel and
Quassim
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hearing r1, Quassim in his turn concludes that Raquel can still have learnt R2 but that
she cannot have learnt R1 because if she had, she would have given A a probability
of 1720 . Hence, r1 = R0 ∪ R2, so that Quassim’s new probability for A becomes
q2 = P(A|Q0 ∩ r1) = 1020 = 12 .
Notice that Raquel and Quassim both realize that the other agent will have elimi-
nated some worlds, namely from the sets Q1 and R1, respectively. Because they do
not know what information the other obtained in the first place, they cannot derive
from that what the new probability assignment of the other agent will be. Raquel
and Quassim really learn something new when tell each other their new probability
assignments, r2 = 720 and q2 = 12 .
Upon hearing q2, Raquel concludes that Quassim cannot have learnt Q2 because
if he had, he would have had q2 = 311 . Importantly, to determine this Raquel uses
her understanding of Quassim’s epistemic situation, including his understanding of
hers. She knows that he has updated on r1, i.e., eliminated R1, and she evaluates
what would have been Quassim’s opinion if he had learnt Q2 at the outset and then
accommodated r1, finding that he would then have given A a probability of 311 . She
thus eliminates all of Q2, taking q2 = Q0. Her new probability for A becomes
r3 = P(A|R0 ∩ q2) = 410 = 25 . Furthermore, upon hearing r2, Quassim concludes
that Raquel cannot have learnt R2 because if she had, she would have had r2 = 611 ,
going through a similar train of higher-order thought as was just described for Raquel.
He eliminates R2 altogether, taking r2 = R0, and his new probability for A becomes
q3 = P(A|Q0 ∩ r2) = 25 as well! He comes to agree with Raquel.
At this point, Raquel and Quassim have achieved common knowledge and so agree
on the probability of A. In this simple case, agreement is reached because both agents
derived what the other agent actually learnt at the outset. But this is not necessary
for the agreement to obtain: it is enough if, among the remaining elements of the
information partition, the probability of A among the worlds still accessible for the
other agent is constant.
3 Representing opinion pooling
We turn to the target of the paper: to show that a process of iterated pooling among
Raquel and Quassim can be framed as a dynamic approach to common knowledge,
through repeated Bayesian updates by Raquel and Quassim on each other’s posteriors.
In this way, we establish that iterated pooling can be rationalized as a specific Bayesian
procedure. We first describe a finite version of consensus through iterated pooling,
which prepares for the proof of the main theorem. At the end of the section, we
consider an extension and a refinement of the result.
3.1 Consensus in finitely many steps
Consider Raquel and Quassim who both have an opinion about A, to wit, P1R(A) = r1
and P1Q(A) = q1. Linear pooling determines that the subsequent opinion of Raquel
P2R(A) is given by
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r2 = wRq1 + (1 − wR)r1. (5)
The parameter wR ∈ [0, 1] specifies to what extent the updated opinion of Raquel
will move towards that of Quassim. By way of interpretation: it measures the trust
that Raquel has in Quassim. With wQ we can determine the subsequent opinion of
Quassim in the same way.3
The pooling operation can be iterated with the same parameters, resulting in a series
of opinions of both Raquel and Quassim:
〈r1, q1〉, 〈r2, q2〉, . . . , 〈rn−1, qn−1〉, 〈rn, qn〉 . . . (6)
If the weights are both constant and sit within the open unit interval, the process
is guaranteed to converge to consensus, 〈p, p〉. This condition is not necessary; see
Jackson (2008, chap. 8) for a more elaborate presentation of the model. The consensus
opinion is a fixed point in the Markov process for which the weights wR and wQ
determine the transition matrix. Intuitively, Raquel and Quassim will traverse the
distance between them in steps proportional to the weights they assign to each other,
and so meet at an intermediate point.
For a numerical example, we can briefly return to Sect. 2.3. We fix r1 = 310 and
q1 = 35 and we choose wR = 16 and wQ = 13 . We then find r2 = 720 and q2 = 12 , then
r3 = 924 and q3 = 920 , and so on, until we reach p = r1 +wR(q1 −r1)/(wR +wq) = 25
after infinitely many iterations.
Except when the weights are the same for all agents, iterated pooling with constant
weights arrives at consensus only in the limit. But in order to align this process to an
approach to common knowledge, it is convenient to convert it to a series with finite
length. Notably, if there is indeed a consensus point p, we can always close off the
series this by adapting the weights in the final step n, namely by scaling up the weights
proportionally so that they add up to 1:
w′R =
wR
wR + wQ = 1 − w
′
Q .
The result of closing off in this way coincides with the result of an indefinite iteration
of pooling. In the example, we obtain w′R = 13 and w′Q = 23 . If we close off at step
n = 3, we then go from r2 = 720 and q2 = 12 straight to r ′3 = 25 = q ′3, thereby following
the approach to common knowledge of Sect. 2.3. Importantly, a series can be closed
off in this way at any step n, and for large n the remaining discrepancy between rn−1
and qn−1 will become vanishingly small.
Considering that common knowledge is attained by a sequence of Bayesian updates,
it might seem crucial that the pooling operation has a Bayesian representation. This
representation is indeed available. Genest and Schervish (1985) prove that we can
always organize our likelihoods in such a way that the prior and posterior conform to
the pooling operation. More precisely, we can choose the likelihoods such that any
3 This model dates back at least to French (1956) and has been developed by Stone (1961), DeGroot (1974)
and numerous others. For philosophers, the classical treatment is Lehrer and Wagner (1981). In what follows
we restrict ourselves to the model presented in DeGroot (1974).
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pair of non-extremal priors for Raquel and Quassim will lead to the pair of posteriors
determined by pooling. This leaves some room for variation in the probability assign-
ments. Specifically, while the expectations that Raquel and Quassim have of each other
must be centered on their own opinion, the shape of the probability distributions over
the opinions of the other agent can be chosen freely. We return to this result and its
use for our purposes in Sect. 3.3.
3.2 A common prior for iterated pooling
We have already provided an example of how a closed-off pooling process can be
accommodated in an Aumann structure: the numbers of the example of iterated pooling
match those of the approach to common knowledge in Sect. 2.3. In what follows, we
are given a closed-off iterated pooling process,
〈r1, q1〉, 〈r2, q2〉, . . . , 〈rn−1, qn−1〉, 〈r ′n, q ′n〉,
such that r ′n = q ′n , and we show that this process can be mapped onto the approach to
common knowledge in general.
Recall that the Aumann structure consisted in a set of possible worlds W , carved
up by two information partitions, R and Q. We first prove a generic Lemma, which
will be applied repeatedly in the proof of the main theorem.
Lemma Let S be a set of worlds and let {Si }0≤i≤m be a filtration, with non-empty
Si+1  Si and S0 = S. Let S be the algebra generated by this filtration and the set
A, where A ∩ Si 
= ∅ for all i . Furthermore, let 〈p1, p2, . . . , pm〉 be a sequence of
length m with 0 < pi < 1 and pi 
= pi ′ unless i = i ′. Then, there is a probability
function P over S such that for all 0 ≤ i < m
P(A|Si ) = pi+1,
where








Proof We prove this for a fixed value m and by induction over i . For i = 0 the case
is trivial: we can simply fix P(A|S) = P(A|S0) = p1. For the inductive step, assume
that we satisfy P(A|Si ′) = pi ′+1 for all i ′ < i , where i < m. In particular, we have
that P(A|Si−1) = pi . We can now add the constraint that P(A|Si ) = pi+1 and hence
show that we can satisfy the constraints P(A|Si ′) = pi ′+1 for all i ′ < i + 1. Writing
x = P(Si |Si−1) and p¯i+1 = P(A|{Si−1\Si }), we have
pi = xpi+1 + (1 − x) p¯i+1.
We can solve for x and p¯i+1 to obtain a range of possible values:
x = pi − p¯i+1
pi+1 − p¯i+1 ,
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where we choose p¯i+1 such that 0 < x < 1, e.g., if pi < pi+1 then 0 < x < pipi+1 ,
and if pi > pi+1 then 0 < x < 1−pi1−pi+1 , which establishes the constraint Eq. (7). unionsq
The Lemma establishes that an update series can lead to any sequence of probability
values for the proposition A. So it can also replicate the probability assignments
resulting from an iterated pooling process.4 The Bayesian rationalization of pooling
mentioned above falls under this general header but is otherwise far more specific,
leaving less room for variation in the common prior. We will return to the use of this
more specific equality for the purpose of linking agreement and consensus towards
the end of this section. First, we prove the main theorem, by applying the Lemma to
all the elements R j and Qk .
Theorem Let 〈ri , qi 〉i≤n be a sequence of probability assignments for a proposition
A, resulting from an iterated pooling that is closed off at n. Then, there is always a
finite two-person Aumann structure 〈W,R,Q〉, a regular common prior P over it, and
a world w ∈ W , such that the approach to common knowledge through the exchange
of posteriors matches the sequence produced by closed off iterated pooling:
PR(A|qi) = ri+1 and PQ(A|ri) = qi+1.
for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n, where PR and PQ are conditioned on events R and Q that
contain w.
Proof The match between dynamic agreement and consensus formation involves the
existence of a finite Aumann structure that can accommodate the exchange and iteated
pooling of opinions, and the existence of a common prior over this structure that
replicates the opinions. On the first claim, we will be brief. It is clear from the foregoing
that such a finite Aumann structure can always be constructed. It merely requires us to
make the structure large enough. The proof thus focuses on the second claim, which
is proved in two parts. First, we establish that the common prior can accommodate
the constraints on the posteriors for Raquel and Quassim. Then, we establish that the
remaining freedom in the common prior easily suffices to meet the constraints needed
for adequate definitions of the update events of Raquel and Quassim.
To accommodate the posteriors of Raquel and Quassim, the common prior must at
least conform to the following:
P(A|R0 ∩ qi) = ri+1, (8)
P(A|Q0 ∩ ri) = qi+1. (9)
We can establish that these constraints can be satisfied by a direct application of the
Lemma. Focusing on Raquel, we substitute R0 for S and for all 0 ≤ i < m we
substitute qi for Si and ri+1 for pi+1, using m = n − 1. The Lemma then states
that any consensus formation process can be accommodated. The same holds for the
4 Notice that we require that pi 
= pi ′ unless i = i ′. If we allow P(Si |Si−1) = x = 1 we can also
accommodate their equality. But for a sequence of opinions resulting from iterated pooling they will always
differ, because the pooling weights are assumed to be smaller than 1.
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process of Quassim, with Q0 for S and the Si ’s and pi+1’s replaced by ri+1’s and
qi ’s, respectively.
Now consider an element Qk of Quassim’s information partition that Raquel elim-
inates when she updates on qm, so Qk ⊂ Qm . Since Qk ⊂ qi for all i < m, the
probability assignment within Qk must comply to specific constraints. Raquel cannot,
until update stage m, rule out that Quassim learnt Qk rather than Q0, hence we must
have
P(A|Qk ∩ ri) = qi+1
for all 0 ≤ i < m. Since these constraints are the same for all Qk ∈ Qm we can
formulate the constraints on that level. Moreover, we can do so for both Raquel and
Quassim and for any update stage. We obtain
P(A|Rm ∩ qi) = ri+1, (10)
P(A|Qm ∩ ri) = qi+1, (11)
for all 0 ≤ i < m and for all m ≤ n. It will be clear that these constraints can also be
met in virtue of the Lemma above.
Notice that R0 ⊂ Rn and Q0 ⊂ Qn , so that the constraints (8) and (9) are covered
by the constraints (10) and (11). Further constraints come from the fact that at stage
i = m, Raquel and Quassim must eliminate elements from the information partition,
P(A|Rm ∩ qm) 
= rm+1, (12)
P(A|Qm ∩ rm) 
= qm+1, (13)
for all m < n. Importantly, because of these inequality constraints, the constraints that
P(A|Rm ∩ qm−1) = rm and P(A|Qm ∩ rm−1) = qm do not entail anything for
the probability assignments within Rm ∩ qi and Qm ∩ ri for i > m.
Now consider what elements of the algebra U are involved in satisfying the con-
straints. We identify the cells U jk = R j ∩ Qk and observe that the constraints of (10)
can be met by adapting the probability assignments of and within all U jk for which
j ≥ k, while the constraints of (11) involve only the probability assignments of and
within U jk for which j ≤ k. These constraints are, therefore, pertaining to disjunct,
non-overlapping parts of the algebra U .
The constraints (12) and (13) do interfere with each other, as they both pertain to the
diagonal, U jk for j = k. But they do so in a benign way, as they only require inequality.
The constraints can in fact be used to ensure that the constraints imposed above and
below the diagonal do not interfere with each other any further. For any row R j ′ , for
example, meeting the constraints pertaining to U j ′k for k < j ′ has implications for
the probability of A within ∪ j ′≤k≤nU j ′k . But because the probabilities in U j ′ j ′ can be
chosen almost entirely freely, the probabilities within the cells U j ′k for k > j ′, sitting
below the diagonal in row R j ′ , are not constrained at all. And the same goes for any
specific column Qk′ .
The one remaining way in which the constraints might interfere is through the
requirements on the relative sizes, as expressed by Eq. (7) in the Lemma. In the Aumann
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structure, this requirement translates to size requirements for both P(ri|Qm) and
P(qi|Rm) for any m and any i < m. The constraints can be met easily by requiring
that these conditional probabilities respect the given constraints, substituting, respec-
tively r ’s and q’s for the p’s in the Lemma. It is clear that we can always meet these
constraints because they all point in the same direction: we simply make sure that
P(ri ∩ qi) diminishes rapidly with inceasing i . We conclude that the common
prior can accommodate all the constraints. unionsq
This establishes that the Aumann structure and the common prior can be chosen
in such a way that the dynamic approach to common knowledge of posteriors repro-
duces the process of iterated pooling described by DeGroot. The proof makes good
on Aumann’s suggestion, cited in the introduction, that his agreement theorem is a
theoretical foundation for consensus through iterated pooling.
3.3 Extending and refining the result
In this section, we briefly investigate extensions and developments of the above theo-
rem. First we consider the extension to an infinitely long iteration of pooling operations.
We then discuss developing the theorem by imposing further constraints on the com-
mon prior or by employing the available freedom in the choice of the prior.
The foregoing establishes that a closed-off pooling process can be replicated as
an approach to common knowledge by orchestrating the common prior in the right
way. But this is not exactly showing that consensus and agreement can be aligned,
because strictly speaking the former requires an infinitely long series of operations.
One response to this is to point to the limiting properties. Because the closing stage n
may be at any time, and because by increasing n we can make the discrepancy between
rn−1 and qn−1 indefinitely small, we can make the discrepancy between the approach
to common knowledge and the consensus formation indefinitely small as well. We
have thus shown the identity of consensus and agreement for all practical purposes.5
Another response is to draw a parallel between closing off a series of pooling
operations, and achieving common knowledge in one update step, as described in
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982). The final update step in the approach to
common knowledge is one in which all is revealed. After step n, neither Raquel nor
Quassim has any doubt left as to the posteriors of the other agent. This step differs
from preceding steps in the update sequence, in which some variation among the
probability assignments within the remaining elements of the information partitions
was retained. We might consider the final pooling operation in similar fashion: it
encompasses all the considerations that would otherwise play out over infinitely many
rounds of pooling. Modeling all these rounds explicitly can be done by expanding the
information partitions indefinitely, but in a Bayesian approach to common knowledge
such an infinite exchange can also be collapsed onto a single update step.
We now turn to further developments of the theorem. Recall that the theorem leaves
considerable freedom in choosing the prior. Consensus through iterated pooling is thus
5 In various studies on iterated pooling, e.g. Zollman (2007) and Mayo-Wilson et al. (2011), it is customary
to apply such a more lenient criterion for consensus.
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aligned with a sizeable class of common priors that each lead to the given pooling
process. The fact that the representation is not a tight fit invites a more extensive
investigation of the systematic relations that obtain between classes of common priors
and pooling processes, with which we will make a very modest beginning here.
One suggestion is to constrain the common prior further, by employing the equiv-
alence of pooling and updating that was proved in Genest and Schervish (1985). This
equivalence is both more specific and more general than the equivalence of this paper.
It only covers a one-shot pooling operation but it is concerned with the level of oper-
ations rather than the level of instances of belief change. It entails not merely that the
actual probability assignments of Raquel and Quassim match the pooling sequence,
but also that the probability assignments of Raquel and Quassim are such that other
priors for the proposition of interest would also lead them to the posteriors obtained
through a pooling operation.
We will not offer a proof of this claim, but we conjecture that the more strict
equality of consensus and agreement is indeed feasible, owing to the same argument
that supports our main theorem. The constraints that are needed to establish the more
strict equality replace the lenient constraints of the Lemma. But they attach to the very
same segments U jk of the algebra and so, for the reasons already stated, they do not
get in the way of each other. It seems that we can, therefore, construct a more narrow
class of common priors that leads to the requisite pooling process, and whose members
have the additional feature that a variation of the initial probabilities r1 and q1 while
leaving the further details of the common prior intact also results in an approach to
common knowledge that mimics a pooling process.
Other developments of the representation are concerned with the nature of the
pooling operation. For one, until now we have considered linear pooling. But seeing the
freedom in choosing the probability assignments that the Lemma still offers, it seems
evident that other pooling operations can also be accommodated in a common prior.
Further, we might investigate how far we can get in pooling probability assignments
over a segment of the algebra rather than a single proposition. Finally, through the
representation we have obtained a different characterisation of pooling processes in
terms of the corresponding common priors. It will be interesting to investigate the
properties of pooling processes by means of their common prior characterisations.
4 Discussion
The main representation theorem provides a rationalization of consensus by iterated
pooling. For any such consensus formation process starting with non-extremal beliefs,
there is a corresponding dynamic agreement model such that, first, the agents in the
latter model reach the same agreement as in the iterated pooling scenario and, second,
the intermediate opinion dynamics leading to consensus or agreement is the same in
both models. In other words, each step in the process of iterated pooling, from first
to last, could be taken by fully rational Bayesian agents with common prior beliefs.
And the iterative process can be explained by reference to an implicit exchange of
information, happening at increasingly higher orders in the belief hierarchy.
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It might seem that this result elevates iterated pooling to the same level as Bayesian
updating, even though it is conceptually far more parsimonious. But the representation
theorem merely shows that any consensus formation process brought about by iterated
pooling can be represented in a Bayesian framework. For this representation to work
we need to choose a distinct prior probability over the richer algebra of epistemic facts.
If we choose another prior probability, we can represent all manner of other processes
of opinion exchange. The Bayesian model of agreement is thus far more powerful than
the pooling model. It provides a foundation rather than a redescription of consensus
through pooling.
One might object that this representation does not provide a satisfactory foundation
of consensus formation by iterated pooling because it is too demanding. In iterated
pooling, the agents operate on the very simple algebra generated by just one element,
A. In dynamic agreement models, this algebra is much richer. We have seen that it
contains propositions regarding the opinions of the others, the opinions of others about
the opinions of others, and so on. Furthermore, the agents have sharp beliefs about all
elements of this complex algebra. So inasmuch as full opinionation is an unrealistic
assumption in probabilistic modeling overall, the situation is aggravated in dynamic
agreement models. The argument might be that the rationalization of iterated pooling
is only made at the cost of overly strong idealization, which renders it less plausible.
We consider this objection in some detail. We first note that there is certainly noth-
ing irrational, epistemically speaking, in being fully opinionated about a rich algebra
of propositions.6 So the fact that iterated pooling can be rationalized in Bayesian
terms is not threatened by observing that full opinionation is not a demand of doxas-
tic rationality.7 To undermine our representation, the over-demandingness objection
might instead appeal to practical considerations, e.g., by arguing that such a system of
beliefs about the beliefs of others is computationally too costly for resource-bounded
agents, or else to over-idealization. But since we are after an epistemic rationaliza-
tion, the appeal to practical considerations does not apply. We thus contend that our
representation theorem is not too demanding as an epistemic rationalization.
Another objection concerns certain peculiarities in the generalization to more than
two agents. In the foregoing we have considered only Raquel and Quassim but as is
well known, consensus formation and dynamic agreement can both be run with any
number of agents. On the side of iterated pooling it is easily seen that this changes
little to the nature of the approach to consensus. If we include Simone next to Quassim
and have Raquel determine her new probability in response to two agents, we may
first combine the opinions of Quassim and Simone using Raquel’s weights, and then
have Raquel adapt her opinion to the combined opinions of the other two, again by
her weights. A parallel reduction to the two agent case can be given on the side of the
approach to agreement. However, the probability assignments required for more than
two agents have to have certain correlations among the agents built in, if we want the
results of updating to match pooling. The Bayesian model thus suggests that pooling
6 Credal sets may or may not provide a better representation of belief states than sharp probability assign-
ments. However, the case may be, it does not impinge on our discussion, which only gets going once a
consensus formation process with sharp probabilities is given.
7 Witnessing a large body of literature on credal sets in epistemology, see e.g. Bradley (2015).
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among more than two agents requires the opinions of the agents to be correlated in a
particular way.
The objection might be that such correlations are artifacts of the way in which
pooling is represented. But we think not: rather we believe that the Bayesian model
offers us a more fine-grained understanding of what we commit to when we engage
in iterated pooling. To apply iterated pooling in a situation with three agents, we must
assume that the agents have probability assignments that satisfy these constraints, and
this is brought out by the Bayesian model. More generally, each consensus formation
process can be associated with a class of output-equivalent Bayesian update processes,
and these equivalence classes indicate the conditions under which iterated pooling is
warranted. Importantly, this viewpoint helps us to answer the criticism that consensus
via pooling is too coarse-grained, and that it ignores epistemically relevant aspects of
social situations. It may well be that pooling blurs out salient distinctions. But whether
these distinctions are unduly neglected when applying iterated pooling depends on the
modeler, who will have to judge whether the conditions for applying iterated pooling
are met in the case at hand.
Continuing in this more positive mode, we believe that the representation provides
a clearer role division for epistemic trust and rational belief change. In pooling models,
trust is embodied both by the weights the agents assign to each other and by the belief
change mechanism, i.e., the linear pooling operation itself. Learning and trusting are
in a sense lumped together. In the dynamic agreement models that we constructed,
on the other hand, the two are clearly separated. Learning is covered by the standard
Bayesian machinery. Trust, on the other hand, is hard-wired in the common prior
and the common knowledge of information partitions, which guarantees a progressive
movement towards agreement upon repeatedly learning each others’ opinion. In other
words, the representation we give is of agents who treat each others’ opinion as pieces
of evidence like any other, but which are a priori disposed to making concessions
towards consensus.
The representation theorem thus shows that the dynamics of beliefs in iterated
pooling can be interpreted in terms of trust and, crucially, higher-order beliefs. At
each step of the process, the agents not only learn about the posteriors of others,
but they also learn what the others have learned about them. This second piece of
information needs not affect the agents’ beliefs in the factual proposition at hand, that
is, in the proposition A of the theorem. But it is crucial that it may change their view
on what the other person might believe regarding that proposition, thus allowing for
further eliminations of elements of the information partition as the process is iterated.
So the mutual trust between the agents that is encoded in the prior leads to consensus
through a dynamics of higher-order beliefs.
One final worry might be that this interpretation of iterated pooling appears incom-
patible with the standard one, the one compatible with the classical “peer disagreement
problem” (Hartmann et al. 2009; Martini et al. 2013), in which differences of opinion
persist even when there is no difference in private information. In such contexts iterated
pooling has been suggested as rational arbitration mechanism. If we read sameness of
private information in a strict sense, i.e., as having the same information partition and
prior, then such cases are obviously ruled out by the assumptions in our representation.
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We believe that this does not speak very strongly against our rationalization of
iterated pooling, since the purported incompatibility only appears under an extremely
strong reading of “sameness of information”. In dynamic agreement models, having
the same factual information about the proposition A, or even about all material facts
in the algebra A, does not rule out having different higher-order information. The
incompatibility with the traditional peer disagreement scenario only appears if we
interpret sameness of information as sameness of first and higher-order information.
But this puts the bar of being an epistemic peer extremely high. Agents in that scenario
are not only equally informed about A, they are equally informed at all higher-order
levels. In that context, it is at the very least questionable whether peer disagreement
can still occur.
5 Conclusion
Summing up, consensus by iterated pooling can be represented as a dynamic agree-
ment process under common prior. This provides a plausible epistemic rationalization
of the former. It does so in a way that highlights potential correlations between the
agent’s beliefs in groups larger than two, and that makes a clear distinction between the
expression of trust and rational belief change. Iterated pooling and dynamic agreement
models should thus not be seen as competing views on how to reach a consensus. In
view of our result, they are perfectly compatible, with the latter offering an interpre-
tation of the former.
Bayesian models are of course more general and fine-grained. It is easy to construct a
dynamic agreement model to which there corresponds no sequence of iterated pooling,
even with changing weights. The example of Sect. 2.3 is a case in point. And the rather
large room to maneuver left by the theorem in the construction of the prior suggests
that the same iterated pooling sequence can be mapped to rather different epistemic
situations. Iterated pooling is thus a special case among the many types of epistemic
situations covered by dynamic agreement models, a case that relies on a specific trust
that obtains among the agents.
Instead of weighing pros and cons of each side, what the result in this paper suggests
is to start traversing the formal bridge between the sides, taking insights and modeling
tools along. Among other things, based on the existence of dynamic agreements we
might look at generalizations of the pooling model that introduce additional param-
eters. This may lead to rationalizable consensus formation processes that are better
tailored to the practice of consensus formation, without sacrificing too much on the
attractive simplicity of consensus through iterated pooling.
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